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INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
UNION, SELF-EMPLOYED, CONSUMER: A
THREE-SI DED CONTROVERSY
The rapid growth and concentration in our industrial framework
have awakened the realization that progress toward optimum utiliza-
tion of our productive resources can only be achieved when natural com-
petitive forces are supplemented by measures carefully designed to iron
out inevitable wrinkles in the economic system. With increasing ac-
ceptance of public regulation, governmental agencies have exercised sur-
veillance over both business and labor organizations in the interest of
those who consume the goods and services produced by the combined
efforts of these two major factions in our economy. Intrastate enter-
prise, however, often has escaped the impact of regulation. Official in-
difference and consumer apathy have resulted in an improvident
toleration of practices injurious to the public interest.
The troublesome interrelation between unions and self-employed in
intrastate trades has been a prominent factor contributing to this diffi-
culty. This relationship and its effect upon the public merit further
consideration.
The term "self-employed"' implies the unique status of the class
under discussion; that is, its members possess attributes of both employer
and employee. They are businessmen in the sense that they own their own
equipment or are responsible for the capital sustaining their undertak-
ings; to the extent that they frequently discharge traditionally managerial
functions, such as contracting, price setting, and ultimate supervision;
and from the standpoint that their remuneration is in the form of
fluctuating profits rather than wages. Insofar as they perform tasks
identical to those engaged in by full-fledged employees, 2 they are laborers.
Indeed, the self-employed estate is a hybrid of two of the major seg-
ments of the economy, business and labor, toward which governmental
regulatory programs are directed.3
It is interesting to note that it was essentially this group which
dominated the economic scene in the period when Anglo-Saxon law first
1. "Businessman-worker" is a frequently used synonym and is also descriptive
of the class. See GREGORY & KATZ, LABOR LAw 343 (1948).
2. Since the self-employer may hire labor rather than working entirely inde-
pendently, it often happens that he is performing the identical tasks as his own
employees.
3. It is not easy to determine precisely the limits of this classification. Theoreti-
cally, it could include the housewife who does her own housecleaning and the building
contractor who occasionally takes time out to pound a nail or two. More obvious and
more important examples arise in the service trades, such as barbering, plumbing, etc.,
and in the retail merchandising field.
NOTES
began to impose restraints upon producers in the interests of the public.4
Early statutory and common law developments were designed to deter
both individual and combined restraints upon free competition. No dis-
tinction was drawn between laborers and entrepreneurs. Not until the
Industrial Revolution and the appearance of large units of production
was the labor exemption from the law of illegal combinations in restraint
of trade first recognized. Justifications commonly advanced in support
of this exception are twofold: (1) the growth of productive units left
the laborer at a distinct bargaining disadvantage with the result that he
was usually subjected to terms of employment dictated by his employer;
(2) in order to preserve favorable standards, the working man needed a
free hand to induce employees of competing producers to organize and
insist on improved working conditions.
When a labor organization today invokes the exemption in defense
of its activities directed against the self-employed, skepticism is war-
ranted by the fact that the union enjoys an inordinate bargaining ad-
vantage., Unless combinations intended to achieve the second objective
were condoned, however, unionized employers would be unable to com-
pete with non-union concerns. This basis for the labor exception thus
argues, with equal vigor, for the vindication of union efforts to organ-
ize the self-employed.
Recognition of this has indticed many courts to approve coercive
tactics aimed by unions at the small businessman. This has been true
despite absence of the added incentive to equate bargaining power by
permitting employee combination. These cases fall into two broad cate-
gories: decisions sanctioning attempts to secure self-employers' con-
formity with union standards, and those upholding efforts to obtain
additional work opportunities by compelling entrepreneurs to surrender
those functions in which union members normally engage.6
Evans v. Retail Clerks Union7 is illustrative of the first group of
cases. A father and two sons who operated a grocery store without out-
side help maintained long business hours. Perceiving that this practice
4. Peppin, Price-Fixing Agreements Under the Sherman Anti-Trust Law, 28
CALIF. L. REv. 297, 310 (1939-40).
5. Rogers v. Poteet, 355 Mo. 986, 199 S.W.2d 378 (1947).
6. One behind the scene factor which often encourages attempted unionization of
the self-employed is the financial prospect of dues and initiation fees. This can be
very important in a trade where the percentage of self-employed is high, as in barber-
ing. This factor possibly explains the recent attempts of the A. F. of L. barbering
affiliate to unionize the self-employed barbers. See Riviello v. Journeymen Barbers'
Union, 88 Cal. App.2d 499, 199 P.2d 400 (1948) ; Foutts v. Journeymen Barbers' Union,
155 Ohio St. 573, 99 N.E.2d 782 (1951); Wisconsin Employment Relations Board
v. Journeymen Barbers' Union, 256 Wis. 77, 39 N.W.2d 725 (1949).
7. 66 Ohio App. 158, 32 N.E.2d 51 (1940).
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jeopardized the favorable standards established in the community by the
union, the court refused to enjoin organizational picketing calculated to
avert that threat.8 The second classification is typified by Steerman v.
Kronse.9 There the proprietors of a motion picture theater were requested
to cease operating their projectors and engage union members to per-
form that task. Construing the term "labor dispute" in an anti-injunction
statute to embrace these facts, the court approved the union's coercive
activities intended to achieve this objective. 10 A similar holding consti-
tuting a more drastic inroad upon the prerogatives of the small tradesman
is Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union.1' In this case the court indorsed
the union's exertion of coercive measures to prevent a small contractor
from participating in the mechanical operations incident to his trade.
Since his volume of business did not warrant full time performance of
managerial functions, the decision virtually deprived him of his
livelihood.
In contrast to the above cases sanctioning the unions' imposition of
restrictions, another line of authority condemns such interferences. Thus,
the Supreme Court of Washington 12 recently frustrated an endeavor to
unionize self-employed used car dealers for the purpose of requiring
maintenance of uniform business hours.. 3 In a Minnesota litigation,' 4
analogous on the facts to the Steerman case, the court declared that an
attempt to force a theater owner to replace himself with AF of L pro-
jector operators infringed his constitutional right to work.15 Similarly
a modern decision", is diametrically opposed to the Senn holding. A
8. See Glover v. Retail Clerks' Union, 10 Alaska 274 (D. Alaska 1942) ; Ex parte
Lyons, 27 Cal. App.2d 293, 81 P.2d 190 (1938); Baker v. Retail Clerks' Union, 313
Ill. App. 432, 40 N.E.2d 571 (1942).
9. 36 Pa. D. & C. 475 (1939). See Rohde v. Dighton, 27 F. Supp. 149 (D. D.C.
1939); cf. Finke v. Schwartz, 28 Ohio N.P., N.S. 407 (1931).
10. The Court held the act wide enough to cover a "dispute of ideas" which in
the instant case was whether a man had the right to be "both a capitalist and a
laborer." Id. at 477. If this were the accepted judicial or legislative attitude, the
unions would be completely free (as long as they used legitimate methods) to annihi-
late the self-employer class. This position is at the opposite pole from that of the
Taft-Hartley Act. See note 26 infra.
11. 222 Wis. 383, 268 N.W. 270 (1936), aff'd, 301 U.S. 468 (1937).
12. Hanke v. Teamsters' Union, 33 Wash.2d 646, 207 P.2d 206 (1949), aff'd, 339
U.S. 470 (1950).
13. Accord, Seveall v. Demers, 322 Mass. 70, 76 N.E.2d 12 (1947) ; Lyle v. Local
Union 452, 174 Tenn. 222, 124 S.W.2d 701 (1939).
14. Roraback v. Motion Picture Machine Operators' Union, 140 Minn. 481, 168
N.W. 766 (1918).
15. See Hughes v. Kansas City Operators' Union, 282 Mo. 304, 221 S.W. 95
(1920); cf. Jenson v. St. Paul Operators' Union, 194 Minn. 58, 259 N.W. 811 (1935)
(under an anti-injunction statute). But cf. Glover v. Minneapolis Bldg. Trades Council,
215 Minn. 533, 10 N.W.2d 481 (1943) (picketing as free speech).
16. Bautista v. Jones, 25 Cal.2d 746, 155 P.2d 343 (1944). See for a discussion of
the case, 44 MIcH. L. REV. 314.
NOTES
Milk Drivers Local was enjoined from pressuring several creameries
with the objective of forcing them to discontinue dealings with independ-
ent vendors of dairy products. The court observed that the conflict
bethveen the union and independents might present a "labor dispute",
thereby condoning attempts tb unionize these vendors. It determined,
however, that the union could not resort to tactics designed to destroy
their means of subsistence while simultaneously denying them the oppor-
tunity to affiliate. These random selections from the sizeable hodge-
podge of precedent disclose the diversity of judicial attitudes toward
coercion of the self-employed.
The background of the union self-employer controversy would be
incomplete, however, without a discussion of the various theories upon
which the courts rely in reaching their conclusions. 17 Frequently these
rationales have been utilized as convenient pegs upon which to support
decisions previously formulated and as substitutes for investigation into
the real merits of competing solutions. Such a technique inevitably cir-
cumvents consideration of those ramifications of the decree which subvert
the public welfare.
The doctrine that peaceful picketing is a constitutional protect ed
adjunct of free speech acquired stature in Thornhill v. Alabama,'" in
1939, and has been frequently reiterated by state'9 and federal courts2 °
alike. While the current attitude of the Supreme Court is uncertain, it
does appear that picketing has not maintained the inviolable status ac-
corded it in the, early 1940's. The latest pronouncements upon the ques-
tion authorize a state to forbid picketing where its purpose is to ac-
complish some objective inconsistent with state enactments 2' or judicially
declared policy. 22 It may safely be predicted that the Court will im-
17. A survey of the cases discloses that with the exception of the picketing and
free speech doctrine the several methods used by the unions have had little effect on
the decisions. Consequently, the note will accordingly limit its discussion.
18. 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
19. Naprawa v. Chicago Janitors' Union, 315 Ill. App. 328, 43 N.E.2d 198 (1942),
leave to appeal disnissed, 382 Ill. 124, 46 N.E.2d 27 (1943); Glover v. Minneapolis Bldg.
Trades Council, 215 Minn. 533, 10 N.W.2d 481 (1943); Friedman v. Blumberg, 342
Pa. 387, 23 A.2d 412 (1941); O'Neil v. Bldg. Service Employees' Union, 9 Wash.2d
507, 115 P.2d 662 (1941).
20. Cafeteria Employees' Union v. Angelos, 320 U.S. 293 (1943); Bakery and
Pastry Drivers v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769 (1942); American Federation of Labor v. Swing,
312 U.S. 321 (1941); Carlson v. California, 310 U.S. 106 (1940); Thornhill v.
Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
21. Building Service Employees v. Gazzam, 339 U.S. 532 (1950) (labor statute);
Giboney v. Empire Storage and Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949) (antitrust statute);
Carpenters and Joiners' Union v. Ritter's Cafe, 315 U.S. 722 (1942) (antitrust statute).
22. Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460 (1950) (racial discrimination); In-
ternational Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Hanke, 339 U.S: 470 (1950) (protection of
self-employed).
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pose no greater constitutional restraint upon state regulation of picket-
ing in the near future than it now wields over legislation of a purely
economic character. It is significant that, in Hanke v. Teamsters'
Union,23 a majority of the Court clearly articulated the power of a state
to prohibit picketing intended to require finionization of self-employed.
Various statutory provisions also have supplied doctrinal vehicles to
which the courts have resorted in resolving union-self-employed contro-
versies. The Norris-LaGuardia Act and its state counterparts have had
a telling influence upon the law in this-respect. Basically, these statutes
forbid use of the injunction in situations concerning so-called "labor
disputes." Because the statutory definition of such a dispute is neces-
sarily couched in broad phraseology, and because of the unique status of
the self-employed, the courts have not been in complete accord as to
what constitutes a "labor dispute" between union and businessman-
worker. One consequence of the application of these statutes, however,
is the revelation of a propensity toward uncritical reliance on precedent
in ascertaining the scope of "labor dispute." Reference to an inflexible
formula has supplanted realistic appraisal of the interests involved.
Other more detailed labor relations statutes, following the pattern
of the Wagner Act, have been invoked in this context. 24  Oriented to
the more familiar labor-management disorders, such legislation is
adapted to the .union-self-employed conflict only through strained in-
terpretation. An example is found in Wisconsin Employment Relations
Board v. Journeymen Barbers Union,2 5 involving an endeavor by the
defendant union to organize self-employed barbers who were themselves
employers of journeymen barbers. Since the Wisconsin labor statutes
precluded employer financial support to unions, the court denounced the
attempted unionization as illegal. It is apparent, however, that this legis-
lation condemned employer domination of the union, rather than union
domination of the self-employed.
The National Labor Relations Act specifically characterizes union
coercion attempting to regiment the self-employed as an unfair labor
practice.26 But many of the divergent, complex issues which arise defy
23. International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Hanke, supra note 22.
24. By 1947, forty-two states had some type of statute affecting labor and
management relationships. Millis and Katz, A Decade of State Labor Legislation, 15
U. or CiI. L. Rzv. 282 (1947-48).
25. 256 Wis. 77, 39 N.W.2d 725 (1949). See for a discussion of the cited case,
34 MARQ. L. REv. 45 (1950-51).
26. "It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents ...
to engage in, or to induce or encourage the employees of any employer to engage in,
a strike or a concerted refusal . . . where an object thereof is: (A) forcing or
requiring any employer or self-employed person to join any labor or employer organi-
zation." 61 STAT. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4) (A) (Supp. 1951).
NOTES
appropriate solution within the framework of the Act's rigid proscription.
Moreover, the labor problems of small entrepreneurs in this category are
customarily governed by state law.2 7 If not solely in intrastate com-
merce, they nevertheless escape the impact of the federal regulation under
the de minimis principle.28
A third instrumentality seized upon by the courts as a basis for
settling disputes between union and self-employed is the venerable com-
mon law illegal purpose doctrine .2  This principle discountenances or-
ganized coerciv e tactics where illegal objectives are being sought, or
where the injury inflicted upon the self-employed cannot be justified by
a showing that it is merely collateral to the advancement of a legitimate
union goal. The virtue of this device is its flexibility, making possible
judicial scrutiny of all relevant considerations, including the collision
of conflicting solutions with the public interest. It is, however, an ad-
vantage somewhat dimmed by stare decisis and by tfie fact that it was
originally applied by judges not entirely solicitous toward the labor
movement.
It is understandable that these diverse judicial perspectives have
failed to establish workable limits to the permissible area of union-self-
employed strife. Nor is it surprising that the decisions frequently fail to
.evidence concern for the public welfare. While this uncertain area has
been largely disregarded by legal scholars, one writer has endeavored to
devise an orderly method of decision. 30 The foundation of .Professor
Herzog's approach is the premise that union interference with the pre-
rogatives of the self-employed is indefensible. However, he concedes two
qualifications of this general rule. One exception vitiates its application
when employees are spuriously clothed with certain attributes of the in-
dependent contractor. Such an arrangement is often devised by large
companies in an effort to evade burdens, incident to the employer-
employee relationship. The consistency with which the decisions accord
with this exception testifies to its validity.3" The second modifi-
27. VAN ARxLE, AN ANALYSIS OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT
1947 (1947).
28. A final type of statute which has been used as a vehicle in reaching decisions
is the antitrust statute. Invocation of these 'statutes, however, has been largely
frustrated by the exemption commonly accorded labor organizations. Later in the note,
the advisability of extending the application of these statutes and the policy behind
them will be discussed.
29. Roraback v. Motion Picture Operators' Union, 140 Minn. 481, 168 N.W. 766
(1918); Lyle v. Local Union 452, 174 Tenn. 222, 124 S.W.2d 701 (1939).
30. HERzOG, Organization of Self-Employers By Unions, 27 CHI-KFNT REV.
263 (1949).
31. Milk Wagon Drivers' Union v. Lake Valley Farm Products, 311 U.S. 91
(1940); Mitchell v. Gibbons, 172 F.2d 970 (8th Cir. 1949); Saito v. Waiters and
Waitresses' Union, 12 N.Y.S.2d 283 (1939); Berger v. Sailors' Union, 29 Wash.2d
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cation is more questionable: coercion is permissible whenever the work-
ing standards of union members are threatened by competition. from
self-employers.32 Literal application of this exception manifestly emascu-
lates the basic premise. By definition, the self-employed perform some
functions similar to those of the union members; consequently, they are
always competing to some extent. For example, they detract from the
available volume of work and often engage in vigorous price rivalry.
But the greatest deficiency inherent in Professor Herzog's trichotomy is
its, failure to recognize the vital interests of consumers in the outcome
of these antagonisms. The urgency of analyzing these disputes with
reference to their effect on the public welfare needs constant re-emphasis.
While it may be difficult to foresee all the consumer interests po-
tentially affected by the reconciliation of union-self-employed differences,-
certain of those interests are easily detected. An example is the implemen-
tation of full competition in the expectation of securing to the public the
most efficient production of goods and services .33 An incident of this
objective is the economic allocation of manpower. Wasteful allotment
of human resources may occur when a small businessman is required
to surrender employee-like tasks to union laborers. If the self-employer's
business is not of sufficient magnitude to warrant full time performance
of managerial duties, such regulation by the union amounts to feather-"
bedding and unduly inflates prices charged to the consumer.
The public interest in effective competition acquires added signifi-
cance when the union purpose is not merely to exact conformity with
established working conditions, but is to deprive self-employers of the
opportunity to work. Toleration of coercion calculated to achieve this
end will foster union monopoly. Ultimately, it may severely limit the
number of workers engaged in the trade, since a dominant union fre-
quently restricts freedom of entrance into its ranks. A natural tendency
will be to augment prices, subvert standards of quality and service, and
foist upon the consumer products of the union's choosing. The most
drastic result may be a gradual- diminution of small business, the exist-
810, 189 P.2d 473 (1948); cf. National Labor Relations Board v. Hearst Publications
322 U.S. 111 (1944). See for discussion of problem of distinguishing sham and
genuine self-employed, Herzog, supra note 27, at 280.
32. "A union may, by peaceful conduct, attempt the organization of a self-employer
if . . . (2) the self-employer, by virtue of the lower working conditions under which
he performs his work, either alone or with the aid of a few helpers, effectively com-
petes with the union men and unionized businesses so as to undermine or threaten to
influence disadvantageously the working conditions or the wage and living standards of
the union men." Herzog, supra note 27, at 278.
33. One bright aspect of this full competition would be minimum prices. As for
hours of doing business, if a self-employed grocer desired to stay open on Saturday
nights, it would certainly seem to be to the advantage of the shopping public to have
him do so.
NOTES
ence of which has been considered a prerequisite to a healthy, progressive
community. In an economy characterized by small productive units, re-
sponsibility and authority are dispersed; incentive and innovation are
encouraged. An ample supply of community leadership is assured.
Even at the cost of instability and short run inefficiency, the advantages
of an economic system posited upon numerous individual enterprises are
weighty. 34
Several courts have recognized the importance of adopting a three
dimensional perspective, weighing consumer requirements, as well as
labor and the interests of small business, in deriving a solution to the
difficulties which -emanate from the union-self-employed controversy.
In Seveall v. Demers,3 5 where the underlying purpose of a picket line
was to insure conformity to established prices, the court enjoined the
activity, perceiving that the exercise of the right of the individual
businessman to establish his own charges was for the public benefit and
therefore' entitled to judicial acknowledgement. Decisions under state
antitrust laws have also injected vitality into this approachA6 In Rogers
v. Poteet,37 such an enactment was invoked to forestall attempts to
unionize a group of independent contractors, each of whom hauled
milk from the producers to various dairies. Characterizing such organ-
izational activities as an illegal restraint of trade, the court stated that
the usual labor union exemption from the antitrust laws was inapplicable
under these circumstances. That exemption, the court insisted, was
based upon the disparity of bargaining power between the individual
laborer and large industry. In this case, however, enforcement of a state
antitrust law was necessitated in order to safeguard the public, as well
as a small entrepreneur, from aggrandizement by a powerful economic unit.
Less frequently, public interests sustaining union objectives have
emerged from the cases. As previously mentioned, the self-employed
34. See Standard Oil of California v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 318 (1949)
(dissenting opinion) ; Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 541 (1933) (dissenting opinion);
United States v. Aluminum Company of America, 148 F.2d 416, 427 (2nd Cir. 1945).
See also, BRANDEIS, THE CURSE OF BIGNESS 100 (1934); WEISSM AN, R. L., SmALL
BUSINESS AND VENTURE CAPITAL (1945).
35. 322 Mass. 70, 76 N.E.2d 12 (1947).
36. In Harper v. Brennan, 311 Mich. 70, 76 N.E.2d 12 (1947), the court enjoined
attempts to unionize a self-employed as a violation of the state's antitrust law. Plain-
tiffs were partners who ran a funeral home without the aid of employees. The defendant
union was not trying to enforce uniform working conditions or to secure work -for its
members, but seemed merely interested in dues and in seeing that the funeral home
handled only union goods and traded only with union businesses. The court in holding
that the union's purposes amounted to restraints of trade under the antitrust laws,
pointed out that these laws were designed for protection of the public and may be
applied to illegal practices of labor unions.
37. 355 Mo. 986, 199 S.W.2d 378 (1947).
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status may be merely a sham used by big business to avoid the expense
and complications growing out of its operations. For example,.although
New York has consistently enjoined union attempts to regulate the self-
employed, it was decided in Saito v. Waiters and Waitresses Union,
8
that a legitimate labor dispute existed. It was manifest that plaintiffs had
set up a partnership embracing all twelve of their workers merely to
avoid the labor problems which plague a typical employer. Most of these
"partners" had made only nominal contributions to capital and had not
exercised any supervision over the business. The court asserted that such
an arrangement was not in the public interest. Not only would it frus-
trate efforts to elevate the living standards of the "partners" to union
levels, but it would also prevent their receipt of such benefits as social
security and workman's compensation, which the-legislature has prescribed
as costs of doing business.
Another instance in which the public interest may be closely allied
with union objectives was illustrated by the depressed economic condi-
tions precipitating the Senn controversy. 39 The court pointed out that
the tile laying trade was experiencing a period of extreme demoralization
exemplified by surplus labor, scarcity of work opportunities, and result-
ing cut-throat competition-particularly from non-union elements. The
decision indicated that under existing circumstances union efforts to
stabilize the industry, although- detrimental to the well being of self-
employed tradesmen, advanced the public welfare.
However essential deference to the public interest may be in the
rivalry context, it becomes even more urgent when unions and the self-
employed actively cooperate. Such combinations constitute a serious
menace when they embrace a substantial portion of the participants in
any trade within a competitive area. Although the aims prompting the
initial alliance may be entirely innocuous, once rapport has been estab-
lished it may readily be perverted in the pursuit of monopolistic control.
The -coalition is easily transformed into a ipechanism to fix prices, allocate
markets or trade areas, and curtail employment opportunities. 40 Private
regulation, without the consumer protection which competition affords,
ensues.
38. 12 N.Y.S.2d 283 (1939).
39. Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union, 301 U.S. 468, 473 (1937).
40. One widespread example of this is the barbering trade. It is the exception
rather than the rule to find price differentials within a competitive area for the services
of the barbering trade. Such organizations have also at times become quite successful
as lobbyists. These efforts are generally directed at obtaining statutory authorization
to limit those who may enter the trade through the use of strict licensing qualifications.
See People v. Brown, 407 Ill. 565, 95 N.E.2d 888 (1950).
NOTES
A potential remedy for this breakdown of natural competitive forces
may be found in state regulations condemning illegal combination.41
Theoretically, little difficulty should be encountered in applying these anti-
trust provisions to union-self-employed combinations despite the widely
recognized exemption accorded labor organizations. It is well recognized
that this exception does not pertain to a conspiracy between union and
employer to achieve an objective which the antitrust laws forbid a com-
bination of employers to pursue. As Justice Black observed in Allen
Bradley v. Local Union, IBEW:42 ". . .we think Congress never in-
tended that unions could, consistently with the Sherman Act, aid non-
labor groups to create business monopolies and to control the marketing
of goods and services."143 Precedent for this view can be found in the
context of union-self-employer combinations. In Columbia River Packers
Ass'n v. Hinton,44 the Sherman Act was successfully invoked to thwart
activities of a union comprising both self-employers and their employees.
Numerous member-fishermen used the organization as a means of col-
lectively marketing their catch. The court labelled this an illegal restraint
of trade; refusing to sanction it under the typical labor union antitrust
exemption.45
In Campbell v. People48 it was determined that a like agreement
contravened the Colorado antitrust laws. A plumbers' local had secured a
contract with a master plumbers' association requiring the latter to em-
ploy only members of the union and further, limiting their right to per-
form. employee functions. In return, the constituents of the union.agreed
to perform services only for master plumber affiliated with the asso-
ciation. The court summarily sidestepped the labor union exception,
perceiving a manifest purpose to establish a plumbing monopoly.
Interestingly, by severely limiting their non-managerial activities, the
master plumbers in the Campbell case acquiesced in an arrangement
which many self-employers have vigorously resisted.47 It may safely be
41. All of the states have antitrust statutes and some have constitutional pro-
visions. To a large degree these state provisions follow and closely resemble the
federal statutes. See STATE ANTI-TRuST LAws (Marketing Laws Survey 1940).
42. 325 U.S. 797 (1945).
43. Id. at 808. Accord, United States v. Women's Sportswear Ass'n, 336 U.S.
460 (1949).
44. 315 U.S. 143 (1942).
45. Local 36 of International Fishermen v. United States, 177 F.2d 320 (9th Cir.
1949).
46. 72 Colo. 213, 210 Pac. 841 (1922).
47. The agreement contained the following clause: "Not more than two members
of any firm would be allowed to work with tools, and no two members of the same
firm would be allowed to work with tools on any job at the same time." Id. at 214, 210
Pac. at 842.
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assumed that many small entrepreneurs have made similar concessions,
detrimental not only to their own interests but also to those of the public,
rather than incur the animosity of powerful labor groups. Since the
union frequently occupies a dominant economic position, attempted oppo-
sition may occasion financial ruin before legal refuge can be secured.
Hence, the small businessman may voluntarily submit to burdensome im-
positions and attempt to pass on to the public ensuing losses. He is
compensated for his concessions by the monopolistic competition which
characterizes such an industry.
That the public is vitally concerned with the contacts between unions
and the self-employed cannot be refuted. Their frequent controversies
indicate the necessity of devising a formula flexible enough to accommo-
date the interests of society with those of the adversaries. A construc-
tive remedial program would include legislation withdrawing this unique
problem from the scope of those enactments designed to cope with typical
labor-management disturbances. 4 It should embody a provision speci-
fically authorizing the courts to analyze all ramifications of union-self-
employed disputes. Assuredly, this would entail delegation of broad dis-
cretion to the judiciary. However, the widely divergent circumstances
giving rise to such discord demonstrate the importance of a flexible
process of decision. Similar in form to the early illegal purpose doctrine
but unrestricted by its array of precedent, this approach would permit
judicious reconciliation of all the interests involved.
Where the need for protection of the public interest arises out of
union-self-employer combination, the problem is one of augmenting in-
adequate natural competitive forces. Vigorous application of state anti-
trust provisions presents a convenient solution. That a labor organization
is a participant in the alliance does not vitiate this conclusion. Likewise
the fact that a localized trade, rather than a nationwide industry, is in-
volved does not mitigate the cumulative ill-effects upon the consumer.
FAIRNESS TO SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION
SHAREHOLDERS DISSENTING FROM CONVERSION
TO FEDERAL CHARTER
Saving and loan associations,' in order to fulfill their primary func-
tions as savings institutions, uniformly arrange the greater part of their
48. See 34 MARQ. L. REv. 45, 48(1950-51).
1. They are frequently referred to as building and loan associations in many
states and as cooperative banks in Massachusetts.
